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Abstract—In a medium sized network, an Intrusion Detection
System (IDS) could produce thousands of alerts a day many of
which may be false positives. In the vast number of triggered
intrusion alerts, identifying those to prioritise is highly challeng-
ing. Alert Correlation and prioritisation are both viable analytical
methods which are commonly used to understand and prioritise
alerts. However, to the author’s knowledge, very few dynamic
prioritisation metrics exist. In this paper, a new prioritisation
metric - OutMet, which is based on measuring the degree to
which an alert belongs to anomalous behaviour is proposed.
OutMet combines alert correlation and prioritisation analysis and
in given attack scenarios, is capable of reducing false positives by
upto 100%. The metric is tested and evaluated using the recently
developed cyber-range dataset provided by Northrop Grumman.
I. INTRODUCTION
Intrusion Alerts are raised by an Intrusion Detection System
(IDS) which is usually situated at the network’s perimeter to
monitor incoming and outgoing traffic. When suspicious or
malicious traffic is observed by the IDS, an alert is raised.
IDS’s identify suspicious or malicious traffic using either
a signature-based approach or an anomaly-based approach.
With signature-based IDSs, traffic is matched against a set of
pre-configured attack patterns called signatures. In the latter
IDS type, statistical methods are used to learn the normal
behaviour of network traffic and alerts are triggered when
traffic deviates from normal behaviour. Both approaches have
limitations – most IDSs are known to trigger a high volume of
intrusion alerts. In the vast number of triggered intrusion alerts,
identifying which alerts to prioritise is challenging. According
to early research [1], [2], upto 99% of raised alerts can be
false positives. False positives indicate alerts either triggered
on normal traffic or alerts triggered on benign attacks (attacks
that are non-successful or cause no network harm).
Thus, most IDS advancements in research and industry
particularly focus on improving the IDS detection rate and
reducing the false positive rate. In this research, the latter
is focussed on by filtering false positive alerts using our
newly proposed prioritisation metric, “OutMet”. We focus
particularly on alerts produced by a signature-based IDS.
Although most signature-based IDSs provide a default priority
level for each alert, it is solely based on the signature matched.
This is argued to be insufficient as attacks launched on a
network trigger multiple alerts therefore the context of a single
attack is unlikely to be captured by analysing a single alert [3].
Alert Correlation is a common approach used in under-
standing this attack context[4]. In alert correlation, a set of
related alerts are grouped into a higher level meta-alert which
represents a single intrusion activity.
Our background research reveals the existence of other
prioritisation and severity metrics however very few focus on
attack context and none are known to prioritise meta-alerts.
In our work, alert correlation is used to derive higher level
meta-alerts which represent attack context. Various properties
which could be used to prioritise meta-alerts were investigated
(Described in Section-III-B1), however, we chose to priori-
tise meta-alerts based on their outlier degree property. This
property was chosen because outliers reflect infrequent and
anomaly behaviours in attack analysis and this often correlates
with true attacks.
The proposed prioritisation metric is evaluated on a recent
intrusion detection dataset provided from a cyber-range exper-
iment carried out by Northrop Grumman [5]. The effectiveness
of the prioritisation metric is illustrated by comparing it to
1)A similar prioritisation metric proposed by Alsubhi et al[6],
[7] and 2)An alternative prioritisation metric which ignores
attack context (i.e. alert correlation). An evaluation on some
of a meta-alert’s properties is also carried out to measure how
relevant they could be under certain attack scenarios.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section-II
describes the related work, Section-III details the proposed
approach for alert prioritisation, Section-IV describes the
results from our experiment,and Section-V describes our plans
for future work.
II. RELATED WORK
To the knowledge of the authors, very little work has
been done on defining Alert Prioritisation metrics for IDS
alerts. Porras first proposed an alert ranking framework, M-
Correlator, with a prioritisation component that consisted of
two security metrics - relevance and the priority scoring[8].
The relevance scoring measured the validity of an alert i.e.
the likelihood of the alert being a true positive. The priority
scoring measured the severity of an alert given the targeted
asset’s value. The priority score also combined an interest
score which measured the degree to which an analyst ex-
pressed interest in the attack category the alert belonged. Using
a Bayesian model they determine the overall priority of an
alert based on the acquired evidence e.g. P(priority = critical
— relevance = low). A limitation in their approach is that
knowledge from alert correlation is not taking into account
during the prioritisation despite their framework consisting of
a similarity based correlation component. Since it is solely
based on user and network knowledge the framework is limited
to discovering known incidents while novel attack incidents
remain un-prioritised.
Noel et al proposed an alert prioritising framework which
used a different metric [9]. The metric calculated the proximity
of an alert to a critical asset. Thus, alerts targeted at assets
closer to critical assets had a higher priority over those further
away. Similarly to Porras et al’s framework, it only uses
network knowledge and no alert or correlation context is taken
into consideration.
A more robust alert prioritisation system is proposed by
Alsubhi et al [6], [7] who defines 7 metrics for prioritising
alerts. Two of the metrics, an alert relationship metric and
a social activity metric, are relevant to our work since they
are based on alert correlation context. The alert relationship
metric measures the degree to which the alert correlates with
successive alerts whereby a high value indicates the alert is
potentially a causal alert. The Social Activity metric is briefly
introduced as a metric used to measure the activity of the
source and destination IP addresses included in each alert.
Zomlot et al also proposed a prioritisation model for the
alert correlation system they had previously presented [10]
[11]. In their work on prioritisation, they use dempster-shafer
to assign a degree of belief to each meta-alert (generated by
the correlation system) which indicated the likelihood of true
positivity given the quality of the IDS sensor which raised the
alerts.
Unlike alert prioritisation, more effort has been focussed
on alert correlation techniques. Using Salah et al’s correlation
model taxonomy, these can be classified into case-based,
similarity-based and sequential-based methods. Case-based
methods involve a rule language that uses expert domain
knowledge to define alert types that may occur in a given
attack scenario.Cuppens et al, Cheung et al, Eckmann and
Kemmerer, and Cedric and Ludovic proposed LAMBDA,
CAML, STATL, and ADELE respectively[12]–[15]. Although
these provide high-quality correlations capturing known at-
tacks, their limitation is that they are difficult to implement and
maintain on a large-scale. In similarity methods, the correla-
tion is based on feature similarity. Valdes and Skinner as well
as Dains first introduced this approach. Although simpler to
implement, such methods do not capture complex nor hidden
correlations [16],[17]. More Recently,Hoffman et al proposed
alert clustering technique[18]. Sequential-based correlation is
more suitable for capturing causally correlated alerts with little
or no apriori knowledge. Sequential-based methods include
those proposed by Ning, and Debar and Wespi[19] [20]. Both
used rule-like pre-requisites and consequences for correlating
alerts. Qin also used abstract pre-requisites and consequences
combined with statistical evaluation for correlating alerts[21].
Sequential-based alert correlation models which use little to no
a-priori knowledge are based on Bayesian inference. Examples
include work by [22]–[24] and [25]. Each of these alert corre-
lation models output a set of meta-alerts represented in a graph
like structure known as an Alert Correlation Graph (ACG).
[26] addresses how ACGs can be made useful to an analyst
by simplifying the graphs using node and edge reduction
techniques. However, few has focussed on how to prioritise
alert correlation graphs in the event where many are produced.
Based on our experiments with alert correlation models this
however, is typical in real environments. In environments
where a vast amount of alerts are produced, it is likely to
achieve an equally vast amount of alert correlation graphs.
This is one of the challenges our work aims to address.
III. OUTMET: THE PROPOSED PRIORITISATION METRIC
Figure 1 represents a sample Snort IDS alert output in
text format. Only certain alert attributes are used in our
analysis process. Each alert is represented using a 6-tuple
a = (α1, α2, ..., α6) where each element of the tuple is the
attribute value of the following attributes: source IP, source
port, destination IP, destination Port, priority (default) and
intrusion type respectively.
Fig. 1. Snort IDS Alert Example
For each alert that is received, the OutMet is calculated over
a series of steps:
A) Alert Correlation: A heuristic similarity measure is used
to correlate alerts into meta-alerts. Each new received
alert is either added to a new meta-alert or joins a
previously existing meta-alert. Meta-alerts are represented
as alert correlation graphs. An alert correlation graph
is a directed acyclic graph G = (E, V,W ) where
each vertex, v ∈ V represents a single intrusion alert,
each edge evi,vj ∈ E indicates a correlation between
two alert vi, vj ∈ V and W contains the weight of each
edge indicating the correlation strength between two alerts.
B) Alert Correlation Graph Comparison: The difference
between each two or more meta-alerts is computed. A set
of additional features which are unique to meta-alerts are
extracted and used in the distance measurement. Graph
Edit Distance (GED)[27] is applied to compare the graph
structure of alert correlation graphs.
C) Alert Correlation Graph Prioritisation: Given a set of
meta-alerts, A prioritisation value is assigned to each meta-
alert based on the degree to which it differs to other meta-
alerts. We use Local Outlier Factor, LOF [28] to derive
this value. Furthermore, we refer to a meta-alert with a
prioritisation value greater than Pθ as an outlier meta-
alert. Such a meta-alert is an alert correlation graph that
differs to the rest of the graph set to a degree which
causes suspicion to arise. Each low-level IDS alert assumes
the prioritisation value of its containing meta-alert. Non-
prioritised meta-alerts (those with prioritisation values less
than Pθ) are filtered and labelled as false-positives.
The next section details each step accordingly.
A. Alert Correlation
Given a stream of intrusion alerts, the most recent-alert,
aj is added to a pre-existing alert correlation graph, gmax as
follows:
gmax ← argmax{C(aj , gi)}
n
i=1 if max{C(aj , gi) > θ}
(1)
Let it be assumed that G is the set of all pre-existing alert
correlation graphs and |G| = n. If n = 0 then a new alert
correlation graph, g0 is initialised and aj becomes the first
alert in g0. Otherwise, the Correlation Strength between aj
and any alert correlation graph is defined as:
C(aj , g)← max{C(ai, aj) : ai ∈ g}
m
i=1 (2)
where m is the number of alerts in a given alert correlation
graph that occurred less than Tθ seconds apart from aj .
A new alert correlation graph may also be initialised if
max{C(aj , gi)}
n
i=0 is less than a defined threshold θ.
The Correlation Strength, C(ai, aj) between two alerts is
given as:
C(ai, aj) =
∑
f∈F
ωf × f
∑
f∈F
ωf
(3)
1) Features: The correlation strength between two alerts
is dependent on the degree to which the alerts share similar
features. In the equation 3, F is a set of correlation features.
Based on the importance of each feature, each feature is
assigned a weight ωk. Each is described subsequently.
(i) Time Proximity (f1) . This feature represents the time
proximity between two alerts. It is derived as a sigmoid
function such that the time proximity between two alerts
decreases as the time between them increases.
f1 =
1
1 + et
where: t =
|tai − taj |
Tθ
(4)
(ii) IP Similarity (f2). This compares the source and the
destination IP of ai to the source and destination IP of
aj respectively. It is a common similarity measure that
indicates that ai and aj are targets to a similar destination
node or/and are from a similar attacker. The higher the
value, the more likely this statement holds true.
A common IP similarity measure is applied for all IP
address features. The IP Similarity Measure S(ip1, ip2)
is the common subnet mask between any two IPs as
shown in Table I.
TABLE I
IP SIMILARITY
172.16.113.20 10101100 . 00010000 . 01110001 . 11001111
172.16.115.20 10101100 . 00010000 . 01110011 . 00010100
Common Mask 11111111 . 11111111 . 11111100 . 00000000
22/36 = 0.61
(iii) Cross IP Similarity (f3). This compares the source and
the destination IP of ai to the destination and source
IP of aj respectively. This feature indicates that aj is
a responsive intrusion to ai. For example, if DestIPai
== SourceIPaj it could indicate that ai was a successful
attempt to exploit DestIPai . After this success,aj could
indicate that this host is now performing intrusive activ-
ities. On the other hand, aj could be an echo alert to ai.
In this case not only is the above condition satisfied but
also SourceIPai == DestIPaj . Since f2 and f3 conflict
each other, i.e. the relationship between two intrusions is
likely to be one or the other but not both, we select only
one of the features based on the feature with the highest
similarity.
(iv) Port Similarity (f4). This feature indicates 1 if both alerts
share the same destination port and 0 if they don’t.
2) Process: To add aj to gmax, aj is added as a vertex in
gmax and the value of C(aj , gmax) is assigned to the edge
between aj and amax ∈ gmax for amax is the alert which
produced the correlation strength. Algorithm 1 describes the
entire correlation process.
3) Complexity: For each incoming alert aj , the time com-
plexity to find the most optimal alert correlation graph to add
aj to is O(N) for N is the total number of alerts in all the pre-
existing alert correlation graphs with timestamps that satisfy
TaJ − Tai .
N increases as the number of incoming alerts increases.
It is also likely to increase if Tθ increases. Thus, though
the complexity for correlating a single alert is reasonable,
in an environment where hundreds of incoming alerts are
received per second, the task of alert correlation becomes
highly complex.
An intuitive approach to ensuring the complexity is feasible
is to ensure N is always of a reasonable size. To achieve this,
sampling is used to select a set of M alerts from N given M
is significantly less than N. A random approach described in
work by Bateni et al was adopted[29].
B. Alert Correlation Graph Comparison
Each alert correlation graph represents a meta-alert where
all the low level IDS alerts contained within it are part of
Algorithm 1 Correlation Process
1: function CORRELATE(aj )
2: aj ⊲ an incoming alert
3: G ⊲ A set of pre-existing alert correlation graphs
4: if G == ∅ then
5: INITIALISEGRAPH(aj )
6: else
7: m = 0
8: for all g ∈ G do
9: for all ai ∈ g do
10: if C(ai, aj) > m then
11: m = C(ai, aj)
12: gmax = g
13: amax = ai
14: end if
15: end for
16: end for
17: if m > θ then
18: gmax(V )← gmax(V ) ∪ v(aj)
19: gmax(E)← eamax,aj
20: else
21: INITIALISEGRAPH(aj )
22: end if
23: end if
24: end function
25:
26: function INITIALISEGRAPH(aj )
27: g ← new graph
28: g(V )← aj
29: end function
the same or similar intrusion. Therefore, it may be meaning-
ful to distinguish similar meta-alerts from highly dissimilar
meta-alerts. This may help in identifying common intrusion
activities and non-frequent intrusive activities.
To achieve this, the alert correlation graphs are compared
using a distance metric. The distance between two alert
correlation graphs, d(g1, g2) is the normalised value of four
weighted features combined. The features are described.
1) Features:
1) Interval Rate (I). The interval rate indicates the average
time interval in milliseconds between any two alerts with
an alert correlation graph. An alert correlation graph with
a low interval rate indicates that the alerts occurred with
rapid succession. This is often found to be the case in
denial of service attacks.
I =
n∑
k=1
tk
n
(5)
and d(Ig1 , Ig2) = |Ig1 − Ig2 |
t = {t1, t2, ...tn} is a list of all the time intervals where
t1 is the interval between the first two alerts in a graph,
t2 and next two and so on.
2) Time Duration (TD). The time duration indicates how
long the intrusion activity lasted and is measured as the
time interval between the first alert v1 and last vn alert
in the alert correlation graph.
TD = |tv1 − tvn | (6)
and d(TDg1 , TDg2) = |TDg1 − TDg2 |
The time duration feature provides more information
when observed alongside the interval rate. E.g. If a high
time duration and a low interval rate is observed then the
alert correlation graph is likely to contain a high number
of alerts.
3) Incoming Rate (IR). This is the ratio of incoming intru-
sions in the alert correlation graph. Domain knowledge
is required to distinguish internal IP addresses from
external.
IR =
# of incoming Alerts
# of Alerts
(7)
and d(IRg1 , IRg2) = |IRg1 − IRg2 |
This feature may prove useful when trying to understand
the context of the intrusive behaviour. For instance, an
alert correlation graph with a higher value (i.e. higher
incoming rate) could potentially indicate a DoS attack
and a graph with a lower value (i.e. higher outgoing
rate) would indicate that the internal host may be being
used to perform malicious activities. A graph with an
average value could indicate a constant activity between
an internal host and an intruder. A case where an attack
pattern graph consists of many ICMP pings and echo
replies would yield an average value.
4) Graph Structure (gs). The nodes and edges of an alert
correlation graph reflect the behaviour of the intrusion
activity and the relationship between alerts of the corre-
lation graph at varying times and stages of the intrusion
activity. The graph structure of any two alert correlation
graph is compared using “Graph edit distance” (GED)
[27]. GED represents the distance between any two graph
structures sg1, sg2 (of g1, g2 respectively) by counting the
minimal number of actions required to transform sg1 into
sg2 by manipulating sg1 using a number of operations
such as node deletion/insertion, edge deletion/insertion
and node/edge substitution. Algorithm2 details the edit
distance process.
2) Process: In Algorithm 2, Lines 2 & 3 are used to sim-
plify the alert correlation graph. The complexity of calculating
the GED between any two graphs is bound by |V| and |E|.
In order to minimize this complexity, the nodes and edges
in the alert correlation graph are aggregated and simplified.
Therefore, an aggregated graph g’ of g is a graph where
all the nodes (i.e. alerts) in g with the same intrusion type
are aggregated in g’ and all edges in g with labels evi,vjare
relabelled Et(vi),t(vj) in g’ where t(v) is the value of the
vertex’s (i.e. alert’s) intrusion type. Furthermore, edges in g’
with identical labels are aggregated.
3) Comparison: The distance between any two alert corre-
lation graph is:
D(g1, g2) =
n∑
i=0
ωpi × pi
n∑
i=0
ωpi
(8)
Algorithm 2 EditDistance between graph structure
1: function EDITDISTANCE(sg’1, sg’2)
2: sg’1 ← Aggregate(sg1)
3: sg’2 ← Aggregate(sg2)
4:
5: L ← maximum cost allowed
6: Q ← ∅ ⊲ A queue sorted by minimum path cost
7: vi ← random vertex from sg’1
8:
9: for vj in sg’2 do
10: s = new substitutePath(vi,vj )
11: Q ← Q ∪ s
12: end for
13: d ← new deletePath(vi)
14: Q ← Q ∪ d
15: while true do
16: e = Q.firstPath()
17: if e.isComplete() then
18: return e
19: end if
20: if e.cost() > L then ⊲ The maximum cost has been exceeded
21: return L
22: end if
23: EXTEND(e, sg’1, sg’2, Q)
24: end while
25: end function
26:
27: function EXTEND(e, sg’1, sg’2, Q)
28: if g’1(V) ⊆ e == true then
29: vi = next vertex in g’1 : vi /∈ e
30: for vj ∈ sg’2 do
31: s ← e ∪ new substitutePath(vi,vj )
32: Q ← Q ∪ s;
33: end for
34: d ← e ∪ new deletePath(vi)
35: Q ← Q ∪ d
36: else
37: for vi ∈ sg’2 do
38: if vi /∈ e then
39: i ← e ∪ new insertPath(vi)
40: end if
41: end for
42: end if
43: end function
44:
C. Alert Correlation Graph Prioritisation
A prioritisation value is assigned to each alert correlation
graph based on its dissimilarity to a set of other alert cor-
relation graphs, G. The prioritisation value is a real number
between 1 and 4 (inclusive) where 1 indicates the least priority
and 4 the highest priority.
p(g) =


1 0 ≤ nlof(g) ≤ 0.25
2 0.25 < nlof(g) ≤ 0.50
3 0.50 < nlof(g) ≤ 0.75
4 0.75 < nlof(g) ≤ 1
(9)
nlof(g) =
lof(g)
max{lof(gi)}
|G|
i=0
nlof(g) is a normalised value which represents the degree
to which g is dissimilar with respect to a set of neighboring
graphs in otherwords, it is the degree to which g is an “outlier”.
This is more coherently illustrated in 2
In figure 2, each point represents a single alert correlation
graph. Graphs closer together indicate the graphs are similar.
Both g1 and g2 are highly outliers and would have high
prioritisation values. g1 is a local outlier to C1 since it is
Fig. 2. Outlier Example
somewhat similar to the members of cluster 1 but also varying.
g2 on the other hand is a global outlier as it is highly dissimilar
to all other alert correlation graphs.
1) Process: lof(g) is computed over three steps:
i Derive g’s kth reachanbility distance and neighborhood:
rdk(g, gj) = max{kDist(g), D(g, gj)}
ii Derive g’s local density: This is the inverse of the average
reachability distance which is defined in equation 10.
lrd(g) := 1/
∑
gj∈Nk(g)
rdk(g, gj)
|Nk(g)|
(10)
iii Derive lof(g):
lof(g) =
∑
o∈Ng
lrdg
lrdgj
|Ng
| (11)
Finally, we calculate nlof of each meta-alert, map it to its
respective prioritisation value and drop all alerts with a priori-
tisation value less than Pθ.
IV. EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
The experiments were based on an attack scenarios con-
tained in the cyber-range dataset provided by Northrop Grum-
man[5]. Each attack was carried out over a day’s period. Our
objective is to illustrate the usefulness of OutMet in filtering
out false positive alerts. We choose to use three metrics:
evaluation techniques.
i False positive Rate Comparison (FPR): This compares
the false positive rate in the alert dataset before and
after applying the OutMet prioritisation metric. A good
performance will indicate a lower FPR. The false positive
rate is measured below:
FPR =
FP
N
=
# of incorrectly prioritised alerts
# of prioritised alerts
(12)
ii True Positive Rate (TPR): The true positive before OutMet
is applied is unknown hence no before and after com-
parison can be made. However, since the number of true
positives before the OutMet application is known, we can
atleast measure the TPR of the OutMet analysis. A good
performance will indicate a higher TPR.
TPR =
TP
P
=
# of correctly prioritised alerts
# of true positive alerts
(13)
iii Reduction Rate (RR): This measures the degree to which
OutMet filters alerts. It takes a lesser preference to TPR
and FPR but we have used it to be useful in scenarios
where the TPR and FPR are uncertain. For example, if a
low FPR and a high TPR is observed, the evaluation is
that the results are good even if the reduction rate is very
low.
RR =
# of alerts after prioritisation
# of alerts before prioritisation
(14)
A. Attack Scenario – DMZ Attack
In this attack an attacker launches an attack on a web server
situated on the DMZ zone of a medium size network (200
clients). The intrusion detection system raises alerts during the
web server attack however it also raises various alerts on non-
malicious traffic. In total, ≈20% of the alerts triggered by the
IDS were false positives triggered on normal traffic related to
email content, host pinging (are you alive?), and unreachable
servers. The web server attack included casual port scanning
of the DMZ servers followed by intrusive scans to discover
and exploit vulnerable services using a brute force approach.
During the entire day course, 3226 DMZ intrusion alerts were
raised.
TABLE II
PARAMETERS USED
θ Tθ k Pθ ω(f1) ω(f2)
0.7 30 mins 10 3 0.25 0.35
ω(f3) ω(f4) ω(I) ω(TD) ω(IR) ω(gs)
0.25 0.15 1 1 1 1
Based on the truth score of the Attack Scenario provided,
only 649 of the alerts were false positives. We set the expected
TPR, FPR and RR rate are 100%, 0%, and 20% respectively.
In other words, this means that the metric should prioritise
2577 alerts, and eliminate 649 alerts. Using the parameters in
TABLE II, OutMet prioritised 1,853 and filtered the remaining.
A TPR of 71.91% and FPR of 0.32% were achieved.
Figure 3 shows a set of Alert Correlation Graps with their
assigned priority values. Due to the frequent communication
between servers on the network, many ICMP Ping and Reply
alerts were triggered by the intrusion detection System. This
resulted in many frequent alert correlation graphs such as
3(b) which capture the Ping-Reply behaviour between servers.
Since these graphs were consistently observed within the
intrusion alert traffic, a low priority value of 1 or 2 (depending
on the number of pings and replies in a single graph) was often
assigned to such a graph.
TABLE III
RESULTS FROM DMZ ATTACK ANALYSIS
TPR FPR RR
Expected 1 0 0.20
OutMet 0.719 0.003 0.426
Alushbhi et al 0.95 0.184 0.202
OutMet *(No AC) 0 1 0
Fig3(a) illustrates an alert correlation graph which captures
the behaviour of an outsider sending suspicious email to a
client residing on the network. After studying the network
topology and configurations it was discovered that packets
were routed from the outsider to the DMZ mail server and
from the DMZ mail server to the internal mail server were
the mail content becomes available to the local client. Many
graphs (although with variations of size and noise) captured
this network behaviour. These graph patterns were less fre-
quent than that observed in 3(b) and were often assigned a
priority value of 2.
Finally, Fig3(c) shows the alert correlation graph of the
real attack launched by the attacker on a DMZ web server.
Most of the attacks in this graph were targeted to exploit web
vulnerabilities. This graph was therefore assigned a higher
priority value since it varied highly to the past observed
behaviour (i.e. graphs) such as those in in Fig3(a) and Fig3(b).
The Alert Relation Metric proposed by Alsubhi et al pri-
oritises alerts based on how similar an alert is to other alerts.
[7].
A comparison between the results of Alsubhi et al and our
work show that we have successfully reduced the false positive
rate despite a lesser true positive rate. We discuss methods for
improving the true positive rate in Section V.
In our research our argument is that alert correlation aids
in capturing attack context. Therefore, analysing the output of
alert correlation is more effective than analysing raw alerts
without correlation. To validate this argument, we performed
OutMet on low-level alerts without first correlating the alerts
i.e. Each alert is assigned an OutMet value based on the degree
to which it is an outlier. (Note that the initial results assigned
OutMet values to alerts based on the degree to which its parent
Meta-alert was an outlier). In this case, Euclidean distance is
used as the distance measure between any two alerts. As the
results show, no alerts were successfully prioritised.
V. FUTURE WORK
The future work of this research focusses around three
core areas. Firstly, in some attack cases, outlier alerts many
not correspond to real attacks, therefore OutMet may not be
suitable for all attack scenarios. To address this, it is aimed to
use other prioritisation metrics used alongside OutMet.
Secondly, our approach to prioritisation is based on static
analysis, i.e. at every set interval, a set of recent meta-alerts are
extracted from the database and their prioritisation values are
calculated. Once done, prioritised meta-alerts are then flagged
for the attention of a security analyst. Although low intervals
could be near real-time it requires high computational power to
run the prioritisation component frequently. On the other hand
larger time intervals may result in detecting an attack too late.
To address this, real-time prioritisation is being investigated
which are based on Incremental local outlier detection[30].
Lastly, OutMet is highly reliant on the quality of the
correlated alerts (i.e. meta-alerts). If meta-alerts contain het-
erogeneous alerts from different intrusive behaviours then it is
highly likely that OutMet will produce a high false positive
Fig. 3. Sample Alert Correlation Graphs (Meta-alerts) derived from analysis with prioritisation values 2 assigned to graph(a), 1 to graph(b) and 4 to graph(c)
rate. We validated this observation by running an additional
experiment where correlation threshold value was between 0.2
and 0.3. This produced a set of alert correlation graphs which
contained a high noise rate. Thus the prioritisation analysis
was highly affected. A possible method to address this is to
improve the correlation component [23], [31]. More statisti-
cally refined alert correlation techniques including probablistic
techniques have been recently proposed[24], [25], [32].
Our research also focuses on investigating new methods for
prioritising and particularly understanding intrusive behaviour.
More recently, we have focussed on extracting attack patterns
from alert correlation graphs and using such patterns as the
basis for labelling attack classes.
VI. SUMMARY
In this research we have presented a new prioritisation
metric. We have argued and proven that (in some cases), true
attacks correlate with outlier activity therefore the OutMet
prioritisation metric can be useful. Our results support this
claim and using a recently developed dataset to measure its
performance, we achieved a TPR of 71% with less than 1%
false positives. The metric is currently being further tested and
integrated into an experimental Cyber Analysis tool developed
at the BT Security Future Practise Research Labs.
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